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1.  Introduction 
 
The recent revival of the economic growth theory has generated renewed interest in the 
nexus between human capital investment and economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  
Cross-country studies reveal that human capital investments in Pakistan are poor: school 
enrollment rates are low and there is great gender disparity in education (Behrman and Schneider, 
1993; Sawada, 1997).  The theory suggests that the low level of schooling in Pakistan may have a 
strong negative effect on the country’s long-term macroeconomic growth.   
At the household level, human capital is accumulated through a complicated decision-
making process.  Educational outcomes typically depend on years of completed schooling, which 
is a stock rather than a flow variable.  Current educational outcomes, therefore, depend not only 
on current decisions but also on past decisions about children’s education.  Thus, general 
reduced-form solutions of the household’s educational investment problem should include the 
entire history of exogenous influences (Strauss and Thomas, 1995).  Yet, historical data on 
individual and household characteristics are rarely available and the dynamic aspects of 
educational attainments are often ignored in the empirical literature on educational investments.  
Even if the data required for this theory were available, introducing dynamics whereby the 
current educational outcome depends on the past outcomes complicates the estimation procedure. 
This paper attempts to overcome the problems of inadequate data and static analyses that 
are found in the existing literature on education.  We believe that in doing so, the paper makes 
two contributions.  First, it shares the findings based on a unique data set on the entire 
retrospective history of child education and household background characteristics in sample 
households in Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan.  The data were   3
collected exclusively for this analysis.  Second, this paper uses the full-information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method to deal with the complicated estimation procedure involving the 
multiple integration of conditional schooling probabilities.  This method, combined with the 
unique data set, enables us to estimate the full sequential model for understanding household 
decisions regarding schooling. 
In this paper, we attempt to identify the major obstacles to school progression in rural 
Pakistan.  The estimation results for sequential schooling probabilities provide new and 
important insights on the household demand for education.  Four important findings emerge from 
our estimation.  One of our most striking discoveries is the high rate of educational retention, 
particularly among girls.  In fact, male and female students show similar rates of progression at a 
higher level of schooling.  Second, we find gender-specific birth-order effects that suggest the 
existence of resource competition among siblings.  At lower levels of schooling, the school 
progression of a child is positively associated with the number of older sisters s/he has.  At higher 
levels of schooling, a child’s schooling probabilities increase with the number of older brothers.  
Third, we find that these schooling patterns can be partly explained by household human capital 
and physical asset ownership as well as by parental income and health shocks.  These results are 
consistent with the theoretical implications of the optimal educational investment behavior under 
binding credit constraints, suggesting that the lack of sufficient credit availability is the major 
obstacle to school progression in rural Pakistan.  Also, our third finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis of self-selection of children in education-friendly households, wherein all children are 
given equal opportunities for higher education.  Finally, we find that constraints on the supply of 
education in villages significantly restrict educational attainment, particularly for girls.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the key features of human   4
capital investments in rural Pakistan as revealed by the field research.  Based on these field 
observations, we apply the standard theory of dynamic schooling investment decisions in Section 
3.  In Section 4, we use this theoretical framework to derive an econometric model for estimating 
the conditional schooling probabilities, and then present the estimation results.  The final section 
lists conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2.  Key Features Identified through Field Observations 
 
Our research approach follows an iterative process suggested by Townsend (1995), which 
involves the following: (1) initial hypothesis, (2) field survey, (3) theory, and (4) empirical 
analysis.  Instead of directly implementing econometric tests based on existing data, we begin 
with the key features of household behaviors discovered through our field study.  The discovery 
of these features led us to modify the data collection procedure during the initial stage.  We then 
augmented the standard theory according to the information collected during field study. 
The field survey is designed exclusively for this paper.  In the first round of the survey, 
conducted between February and April 1997, the survey team interviewed families in 14 villages 
of the Faisalabad and Attock districts of the Punjab province.  In the second round from 
December 1997 to January 1998, the team interviewed selected families in 11 villages of the Dir 
district of the NWFP.  The survey covered 203 households in Punjab and 164 households in the 
NWFP and collected information on 2,365 children in those households.
1  The data provide a 
complete set of retrospective histories of children’s schooling in addition to a wide range of 
                              
1 The selection of our survey sites was predetermined because we essentially resurveyed the panel 
households that had participated in the interviews for the Food Security Management Project of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Alderman and Garcia, 1993; Alderman, 1996).  The   5
household- and village-level information. 
In our retrospective surveys, we used three different sets of questionnaires (Appendix A).  
The first questionnaire gathered basic information on children and their school progression since 
the first marriage of the household head.  Respondents were asked to compare each year with the 
average year in order to obtain detailed information regarding income and health shocks for all 
the years.  The second questionnaire collected data on household background characteristics such 
as household size, permanent components of household resources, and fluctuations in household 
assets and income over time.  The third questionnaire gathered village-level retrospective 
information by interviewing local government officials and/or educated village residents such as 
schoolteachers; for example, one of the questions inquires about when the primary schools for 
boys and girls were set up in the village.   
Our survey uncovered a number of noteworthy features of household behavior.  The most 
striking feature was the high educational retention rate.  According to our survey data, the 
average number of years of schooling was 1.6 for girls and 6.6 for boys.  However, for children 
who had entered primary school, the average number of years of schooling was 6.0 for girls and 
8.8 for boys.  These figures indicate that a substantial proportion of children in rural Pakistan do 
not receive any education. 
In order to examine the rates of school progression at different educational stages, we 
estimate the conditional survival function, that is, the probability of school continuation.  The 
Pakistani educational system constitutes five years of primary education and five years of 
secondary education, followed by postsecondary education.
2  Educational outcomes can be 
                                                                                                 
initial IFPRI data collection was based on a stratified random sampling scheme.  A detailed description of 
the procedure for our field surveys is summarized in Appendix A. 
2 In precise terms, secondary education in Pakistan comprises three years of middle school education and   6
modeled as an outcome of five sequential schooling decisions that households make.  We define 
Sτ  as the schooling time of a child at the τ
th educational stage.  Then, the first decision a 
household makes is whether to enroll a child in primary school (S1).  For households with 
children already in primary school, the second decision is whether to keep the children enrolled 
until they graduate from primary school (S2).  In the third stage, households choose whether to 
enroll primary school graduates in secondary school or to discontinue education at Grade Five 
(S3).  Next, the households decide whether to withdraw a child from school before Grade Ten or 
to continue her/his education until the completion of secondary school (S4).  The final decision is 




Let nk denote the number of students who have completed education at stage Sk–1.  To 
determine this number, we use data on children for whom Sk–1 is not right-censored at education 
level k – 1.  The set of individuals whose school attainment is at least Sk–1 is referred to as the risk 
set at the k
th stage of education Sk.  Then, nk represents the size of the risk set at level k.  Among 
nk students, let hk be the number of children who have completed education at level k so that hk = 
nk+1.  Then, an empirical estimate of the conditional survival probability at education level k 
would be hk/nk.  This ratio represents the fraction of students who progressed to a higher stage of 
education, conditional on the completion of education level k – 1.  This can also be interpreted as 
the conditional sample probability of school continuation to education level k. 
The estimated conditional probabilities for educational survival are summarized in Table 
1.  The survival rate at the first educational entry point—that is, the probability of entering 
                                                                                                 
two years of secondary school education. 
3 We assume that the decision of not sending a child to primary school was made when the child was 6 
years old, which is the median age for primary school entry (Table 3).  We impose similar assumptions for   7
school—is low for both boys (59%) and girls (22%).  In the case of girls, the probability of 
entering primary school is less than half that for boys.  However, after entering primary school, 
the conditional rates of primary school graduation are 78% for boys and 67% for girls.  These 
statistics indicate that a majority of the children remain in school once they enroll.  Another 
interesting finding is that while girls have a lower conditional probability of entering and 
graduating from primary school and entering secondary school than do boys, in the Punjab 
province, girls’ conditional schooling probabilities after secondary school entry are consistently 
higher than those of boys.
4  The gender differences in educational attainments eventually 
disappear at higher levels of schooling.  We believe that this finding is new and makes a 
contribution to the existing literature; further, it is an indication that gender dynamics are more 
complex than previously recognized (King and Hill, 1993; Schultz, 1995). 
We consider two competing hypotheses that might explain these patterns.  The first 
hypothesis is the “pick-the-winner” hypothesis (PTW hypothesis, hereafter), wherein parents 
select a limited number of children as the winners for educational specialization and allocate 
more resources to them.  The alternative hypothesis is the self-selection in education-friendly 
households at higher levels of schooling (EFH hypothesis, hereafter), wherein parents try to 
educate all children equally.  In order to compare these two competing hypotheses, we calculate 
an indicator of child education-friendliness (Education-friendliness index; EFI), which is 
measured by the proportion of children in the household who have completed each education 
level.  If the EFI for households that send children to school at a certain level is higher than that 
for households that discontinue children’s education, the EFH hypothesis would be verified.  
                                                                                                 
secondary and postsecondary education. 
4 Table 1 also shows that many girls discontinue education before entering secondary school, whereas 
many boys drop out of secondary school after enrolling in it.   8
Table 2 presents the average values of the EFI for each educational stage.  These values show, for 
example, that if one or more children complete primary school in a family, on average, 42.9% of 
all children in the family will also enter primary school.  On the other hand, if no child completes 
primary education, on average, only 28% of the children in the family enter primary school.  If 
the PTW hypothesis were true, the former figure would be lower than the latter.  Our results 
reveal that children who continued education hailed from education-friendly households.   
Further, at the primary school entry level, the EFI of households with one or more 
daughters who completed primary school is 29.80% (Table 2).  The degree of education 
friendliness is less clear in the case of girls; nonetheless, it should be noted that the EFI is lower 
in the case of families with no daughter who completed primary school, i.e., 22.94%.  Hence, our 
results are in favor of the EFH hypothesis, not the PTW hypothesis.
5 
Yet, we compare an extreme version of the PTW hypothesis and the EFH hypothesis.  If 
the most capable child is the only one to receive education and the other children in the family 
are completely ignored, i.e., they receive no education at all, then the average proportion of 
children who receive education at a certain educational stage should not be correlated with 
whether or not a child enters the next educational stage.  In reality, however, parents observe the 
learning performance of their children at every educational stage, then pick the best child, and 
encourage her/him to continue to the next stage.  The statistics in Table 2 are consistent with this 
view although they favor the EFH hypothesis.  Moreover, we need to control the effects of child- 
and household-level characteristics in order to compare these two hypotheses.  Therefore, the 
                              
5 Labor economics literature has some acclaimed empirical studies testing this type of selection.  For 
example, Farber and Gibbons (1996) used test scores known to an employee but unknown to her/his 
employer to test the selection hypothesis.  If talented workers are more likely to survive and such talent is 
correlated with test scores, returns to test scores (talent) should increase over time. Similarly, the survival 
rate in schooling for children should be high when education friendliness, unobservable to many, is high in 
our setting.    9
numbers reported in Table 2 should be interpreted with some reservation. 
The basic data also suggest substantial differences in the extent of gender disparity in 
education at the district level.  Table 1 shows that in the Dir district of the NWFP, the conditional 
survival rates are consistently lower for girls at all stages of schooling decisions.  The differences 
by district appear to be largely due to sociocultural factors.  For example, the custom of seclusion 
of women, purdah, is maintained strictly in the Dir district.  These regional divergences in the 
gender disparity in education in rural Pakistan raise an important policy issue.
6   
 
3.  The Standard Theory of Educational Investments 
 
Having discussed the key field observations, we next formulate a formal model of a 
household’s optimal schooling behavior.  As an initial theoretical framework, we employ two 
sets of optimal behavioral rules.  First, parents decide on the intertemporal allocation of resources 
in order to maximize the expected total lifetime utility of the family.  Second, they decide the 
allocation of educational resources among their children, given the overall resource constraints of 
the household. 
We use a human capital investment model under uncertainty, which is similar to the 
models used by Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), as a benchmark and 
apply it in the context of rural Pakistan.  In particular, we extend the Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) 
model to a more general form with multiple children under risk, uncertainty, and a household’s 
constraints on insurance and credit. 
                              
6 Alderman et al. (1995) suggested that when the government allocates education expenditures, 
disadvantaged groups such as girls and children in lagging regions should be targeted in order to ensure 
more equitable gains from schooling.   10
Suppose that a household with n children decides on household consumption C and 
normalized schooling time Si for child i, with 0 ≤ Si ≤ 1, in order to maximize its aggregated 
expected utility with the concave instantaneous utility function U(•), given the information set at 
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In this problem, the household maximization function includes a concave function W(•) of the 
financial bequest and salvage value of the final stock of the child’s human capital.  The parameter 
ρ represents a subjective discount rate.  The first constraint is the household’s intertemporal 
budget constraint.  The household’s consumable resources in each period comprise assets A; 
stochastic parental income Y, which is a function of parents’ human capital H
P; and total child 
income Σiwi(1 – Sit), with wi being the child-specific wage rate that is exogenously given.
7  The 
time endowment of a child is normalized to unity.  The second constraint is the human capital 
accumulation equation.  Human capital production is a concave function, f(•), of S and parameter 
                              
7 We assume that a child’s schooling does not change the child wage rate immediately, and accumulated 
human capital H
C is reflected in the income after the child becomes an adult.  In rural Pakistan, the child 
labor market does not appear to be segmented by the level of schooling; as is well known, this is because 
the wage rate is not sensitive to education in the rural agricultural areas where we conducted our surveys 
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999).   11
q, which implicitly represents the returns to education and is reflected in the value of W.  The 
parameter, q, can also be interpreted as the efficiency of producing human capital.  An additive 
and independent stochastic element e incorporates shocks that affect children’s accumulation of 
human capital.  We assume that e is independently distributed with Et(eit) = 0 for all i.  The third 
constraint represents the potentially binding credit constraint where B is the maximum amount of 
credit available to a household. 
This stochastic programming model has n + 1 state variables: physical assets A and child 
human assets Hit
C, where i = 1, 2, …, n.  While general analytical solutions to this household’s 
investment problem cannot be obtained, we can derive a set of first-order conditions that are 
necessary for an optimal solution by applying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the standard 
Bellman equation.   
There are two different solutions to this problem of lifetime utility maximization.  When a 
household can borrow and save at an exogenously given interest rate, the credit constraint is not 
binding.  In this case, the household determines the optimal schooling behavior for its children to 
equalize the net marginal rate of transformation of human capital production and the non-
















, ∀ i. (1) 
By using the implicit function theorem, equation (1) shows that the optimal level of schooling Sit 
is a function of returns to education, the market interest rate, and the lagged schooling variable, 
Sit–1.
8  If the household’s credit constraint is not binding, the schooling decision for one child is 
not affected by the schooling decisions for other children or by the parental income.  In this case, 
two separability conditions hold: one for consumption and schooling decisions, and the other for   12
intrahousehold schooling allocation. 
If the household cannot borrow, it effectively faces an endogenous shadow interest rate, 
which is represented by the marginal rate of substitution of consumption over time.  Under credit 
market imperfections, the separability condition fails to hold for schooling decisions regarding 
different children.  Further, the separability between consumption and schooling investment 
decisions ceases to exist.  At the optimum, the marginal rate of transformation of educational 








































, ∀ i. (2) 
Then, the optimal level of schooling Sit is determined by three sets of additional factors that affect 
the marginal utility and the endogenous shadow interest rate.
9  First, there will be a competition 
for educational resources among siblings.  For example, in any given household, an increase in 
one child’s schooling time or in the opportunity cost of schooling decreases a sibling’s optimal 
level of schooling.
10  Alternatively, the wage earnings of older siblings will enhance the optimal 
time allocation for the schooling of younger siblings.  The second set of variables represents the 
ownership of physical and human assets.  Finally, an ex post realization of shocks to the parental 
income will affect the child’s schooling.  In contrast to households with access to credit, wherein 
the parental income has no effect on a child’s schooling, a credit-constrained household has to 
contend with high marginal costs of schooling if there is a negative income shock.  This reflects 
the inseparability of consumption and schooling decisions under a binding credit constraint.   
                                                                                                 
8 See Appendix B for an analytical solution for this condition under specific functional forms. 
9 See Appendix B for an analytical solution for this condition under specific functional forms. 
10 According to equation (2), the implicit optimization behavior of a household for the i
th child is 
conditional on that for all the other children.  The optimal choice of child i’s schooling Si depends on S-i, 
which is the optimal schooling decision made for a child other than i.  This solution can be interpreted as a 
standard demand system.   13
 
Testable Implication I: Gender Difference 
There are three testable hypotheses that could be derived from our model.  First, it is often 
argued that in Pakistan, the significant difference between males and females in terms of returns 
to schooling leads to a distinct gap in educational investments (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 
1999).  We utilize our framework’s human capital production function, f(•), to show that the 
gender difference in schooling outcomes is the result of a household’s optimization behavior.  
From (1) and (2), it is clear that regardless of credit accessibility, the following relation should 




















In order to illustrate the role of returns to education, we utilize the Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) specification of the education production function: 
  ( ) [ ] it it it it S q q S f − − = exp ) , ( 1 0 γ γ , (4) 
where γ0 > 0 and γ1 > 0.  From (3) and (4), the optimal investment rule implies that  
  () ( ) jt jt jt it it it g S S g S S − − = − − − − 1 1 , (5) 
where g represents the growth rate of q.  Equation (5) demonstrates that if the growth rate of 
returns to education is higher for boys than for girls (git > gjt), a household invests more in a male 
child i’s education than in a female child j’s education.  We can use these findings to interpret the 
estimated results of the gender variables in our empirical model. 
   14
Testable Implication II: Credit Constraints 
The second important testable hypothesis, which can be derived by comparing (1) and (2), 
concerns the role of credit constraints in educational investments.  The analytical solution in 
Appendix B demonstrates that under the binding credit constraint, a child’s schooling is affected 
by variables related to siblings, proxy variables for asset ownership and household human 
capital, and shocks to household income.  However, these factors should have no effect on a 
child’s schooling under the condition of perfect credit availability.   
 
Testable Implication III: PTW versus EFH 
The third important testable implication of our theoretical model concerns the PTW and 
the EFH hypotheses.  The former hypothesis holds when we assume a convexity of W(•), while 





αi, where αi is a weighting parameter.  In the steady state, where ΔH
C
iT+1 is the same for 





jT+1, with equation (4) to derive the following condition: 













.  If W(•) is concave, ∑αi ≤ 1, and the levels of 
schooling of the various children in the family should not be too different.  Moreover, in this 
case, the availability of household resources should have an equal effect on children’s education.  
This should be consistent with the EFH hypothesis.  On the other hand, if W(•) is convex, a 
household would attach a greater weight to a particular child, leading to an unequal distribution 
of educational investments among the children in the family.  Assuming that weights are assigned 
according to each child’s ability, this case represents the PTW hypothesis.     15
Based on the PTW hypothesis, educated parents do not necessarily ensure that all their 
children progress to higher levels of education.  Therefore, the correlation between parental 
resources and child-level progression in education is supposed to be weak.  On the other hand, 
education-friendly households ensure that all their children move on to higher levels of 
education; thus, the correlation between parental resources and the rate of child-level school 
progression becomes positive. 
 
4.  The Econometric Framework and Estimation Results 
 
Two empirical approaches for investigating the process of household decision-making 
with regard to schooling based on the investment model are represented implicitly by equations 
(1) and (2).
11  The traditional approach employs a linear regression model for years of schooling, 
with controls for various household background characteristics (Taubman, 1989).  The problem 
with this approach is that it estimates time-invariant parameters for a sequential decision-making 
process for educational investment.  The parameters in this model cannot be interpreted as 
educational-stage-specific parameters. 
A second approach formalizes the process of schooling in a stochastic decision-making 
model (Mare, 1980; Lillard and Willis, 1994; Behrman et al., 2000).  This approach explicitly 
investigates the determinants of the process of grade transition.  The model estimates the 
                              
11 A third approach involves applying the structural estimation framework to a dynamic stochastic discrete 
choice model.  For a literature survey, see Amemiya (1996) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989).  Yet, the 
schooling choice set of a household with n children comprises 2
n mutually exclusive, discrete dependent 
variables.  Since n averages to approximately seven in the Pakistani households we surveyed, the 
structural estimation of such a model will be computationally intractable.  Applications of this framework 
to development issues include estimates of fertility decisions using Malaysian data (Wolpin, 1984), 
sequential farm labor decisions using data from Burkina Faso (Fafchamps, 1993), bullock accumulation 
decisions of Indian farmers (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), the gender- and age-specific values of   16
probability of schooling at the τ
th grade conditional on the completion of the τ – 1
th grade.  The 
advantage of this methodology over the linear regression approach is that it can estimate the 
stage-specific parameters.  Amemiya (1975) provides the statistical foundation for estimating 
such sequential decision-making models.  Various scholars applied this approach to estimate the 
probabilities of school and grade transition.  For example, using a Malaysian data set, Lillard and 
Willis (1994) estimated a model of sequential schooling decision, controlling for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Cameron and Heckman (1998) constructed a theoretical model to 
examine the effect of household characteristics on school transition probabilities.  Other papers 
focused on only one transition from among many sequences of the schooling process, such as the 
transition probability of high school graduates (Willis and Rosen, 1979). 
We follow the second econometric approach and estimate the sequential schooling 
decision model jointly.  We employ the FIML method that allows for the correlation of error 
terms in different educational stages and thus mitigates the self-selection bias of education-
friendly households.  
There are three levels of schooling in Pakistan: primary, secondary, and postsecondary.  
Children’s educational outcomes are assumed to be a result of the five sequential decisions made 
by the households they live in (Section 2).  In order to formalize the sequential schooling process, 
we define an indicator variable of schooling: 
  δiτ = 1 if Siτ > 0  (6) 
          = 0 otherwise, 
where τ indicates the τ
th stage of education and S is a latent variable implicitly corresponding to 
the variable S in (1) and (2).  δiτ = 1 if child i enters school at the τ
th stage of education.  Then, the 
                                                                                                 
Korean children (Ahn, 1995), and well investment decisions in India (Fafchamps and Pender, 1997).   17
sequential process of the schooling decision can be described as follows: children are born with 
zero years of schooling.  At the age of 6, some enter primary school, while others remain 
uneducated.  The uneducated children who have not entered primary school, Si1 = 0, are 
represented by the indicator variable δi1 = 0.  Having entered primary school (Si1 > 0 and δi1 = 1), 
some children complete this stage of education (δi2 = 1 or Si2 > 0), while others drop out (δi2 = 0 
or Si2 ≤ 0).  After graduating from primary school, some children enter secondary school (δi3 = 1 
or Si3 > 0), while others do not (δi3 = 0 or Si3 ≤ 0).  Then, some children proceed to complete 
secondary school (δi4 = 1 or Si4 > 0), and others discontinue schooling during this stage (δi4 = 0 or 
Si4 ≤ 0).  Finally, after finishing secondary school, some children enter postsecondary school (δi5 
= 1 or Si5 > 0), while others do not (δi5 = 0 or Si5 ≤ 0).  
In the linearized form,  equation (2) can be represented as 
  τ τ τ τ β i i i u X S + = , (7) 
where τ = 1, 2,…,5; uiτ ≡ Siτ–1 + εiτ; and Si0 = 0 by construction.  In Appendix B, we derive an 
analytical solution for Siτ under specific function forms.  While we do not use this explicit 
structure of the error term, we allow the error terms, uiτ, to be serially correlated.  The set of 
explanatory variables X includes variables on gender and sibling composition, household asset 
and human capital, and household shock variables.   
Assuming that household decision-making is independent across stages of education or, 
equivalently, uiτ is independent across τ, the sequential model of equations (6) and (7) can be 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood functions of dichotomous models (independent error 
term specification) (Amemiya, 1975).  However, our theoretical results in (1) and (2) 
demonstrate that schooling decisions are not independent across stages and uiτ’s are serially   18
correlated because uiτ ≡ Xiτ–1 βτ–1 + uiτ–1 + εiτ.  These serial correlations can be explained, for 
example, by some unobserved propensity for schooling that is stronger among children who 
graduated from a certain grade than among those who failed to finish this grade. 
Suppose that the joint probability density function of the error term uiτ is represented by 
f(ui1, ui2, ui3, ui4, ui5).  Then, the probability of entering postsecondary education, Pr (δi5 = 1), can 
be represented by  
  Pr (Si5 > 0, Si4 > 0, Si3 > 0, Si2 > 0, Si1 > 0)  (8)  
 =  1 2 3 4 5 5 4 3 2 1   ) , , , , (
1 12 23 34 45 5
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The direct calculation of such a high-dimensional integral is computationally complex and may 
be unfeasible because the integral must be evaluated at each step of the likelihood maximization.  
Two possible methods can be used to deal with this problem.  Both methods rely on the fact that 
the unconditional joint distribution (8) can be presented as a weighted sum of the products of 
univariate distributions.  If no assumptions are made regarding the form of the joint distribution 
of the error terms in the system of equations represented by (7), uiτ, then, assuming the common-
factor error structure, the joint distribution can be approximated nonparametrically by a step 
function (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Mroz, 1999).  Alternatively, under the assumption of joint 
normality, the distribution of the error terms in the system of equations represented by (7) can be 
approximated using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature (see Judd, 1998).  Although the first method 
imposes fewer restrictions on the error structure in the system of equations represented by (7), it 
is computationally less stable.  The likelihood function that results from a nonparametric 
estimation of the error distribution (8) is highly nonlinear, and our maximization algorithm fails 
to find a global optimum.  An approach based on the Gauss-Hermite quadrature demonstrates   19
better convergence properties, and this is the method we use for our estimations. (We refer to this 
method as the FIML method.)  Then, the log-likelihood function ℑ for the system of equations 
represented by (7) is as follows: 
  () ∑∑ ∑ ∏ ∑






























τ υ υ υ β ω ω ω , (9) 
where N is the total number of observations in the sample, PR
τ(•) is the set of the cumulative 
distribution functions for every equation in system (7) conditional on the common factors, the υ’s 
and ω’s are one-dimensional quadrature points (nodes) and weights from a Gauss-Hermite rule 
(Stroud and Secrest, 1966), and the M’s represent the number of quadrature points.
12  As was the 
case previously, X’s represent the equation-specific sets of explanatory variables and β’s 
represent the vectors of unknown parameters that are to be estimated. 
The estimations presented in this paper are based on the approximation of the probability 
integral by the Gauss-Hermite quadrature with three nodes.
13  An additional increase in the 
number of nodes fails to improve the value of the log-likelihood function.  Identification is 
achieved through the inclusion of stage-specific variables such as school supply, a household’s 
human and physical assets, and income and health shocks.  This will be discussed further in the 
next subsection.  According to the likelihood-ratio test criterion, the independent error 
specification is rejected in favor of the FIML specification that assumes a joint normality of the 
                              
12 The optimal number of common factors is determined according to the following rule: consider Q < 0; 
Q = 0.5[(p – m)
2 – p – m], where p is the number of equations and m is the number of common factors 
(Anderson and Rubin, 1956).  We require at least three common factors to satisfy this condition in the 
case of five equations (p = 5). 
13 The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood using the DFP algorithm (Powell, 
1977) with analytical derivatives.  The variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients is 
estimated by approximating the asymptotic covariance matrix by the so-called “sandwich” estimator (see, 




4.1.  Variables  
 
In estimating the sequential schooling model discussed above, we begin by inspecting the 
basic characteristics of our data set.  The median age of school entry is 6 years for primary 
school, 11 years for secondary school, and 17 years for postsecondary school (Table 3).  On 
average, children spend 5 years in primary and 6 years in secondary school.  Since the formal 
length of secondary-level schooling in Pakistan is 5 years, an extra year in secondary education 
indicates grade repetition or a delay in secondary school entry, which is a common occurrence in 
Pakistani villages. 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables used in the sequential model of 
equations (6) and (7), in terms of the discrete dependent variable for Siτ and the covariates of 
conditional probabilities X.  Our independent variables could be divided into six main blocks. 
The first block of controls includes variables on gender differences, which are divided 
into two subgroups according to province.  The first gender variable is for the Punjab province.  
It is a dummy variable that takes 1 for females and 0 otherwise.  Similarly, the second gender 
dummy variable for the NWFP takes 1 for females and 0 otherwise.  These dummy variables 
indicate that the share of female students declined at the primary school entry level (Table 4).  
Later, we also include the auxiliary gender variable for males in the NWFP, which takes 1 for 
males in the NWFP and 0 otherwise. 
                              
14 The results of the independent error term specification can be obtained from the authors on request.  
While the independent error term model is believed to provide biased coefficients owing to the 
correlations of sequential decisions, the qualitative results of the independent error model and the FIML   21
In the second block of explanatory variables, we include the number of older brothers and 
sisters.  We could incorporate more detailed sibling composition variables separated by the 
current schooling status.  Yet, an inclusion of such variables will generate serious endogeneity 
bias.  Alternatively, the number of older siblings is predetermined, and therefore, we treat this 
figure as being exogenous.  The descriptive statistics show a negative correlation between the 
education level of a child and the number of older siblings (Table 4).  This suggests that students 
who could gain access to higher education were from households with a small number of 
children.  This could be reflective of intrahousehold competition for resources between the 
siblings or of birth-order effects. 
The third set comprises household physical and human asset variables and includes the 
amount of land owned and a dummy variable for tractor ownership.
15  The household human 
capital characteristics with regard to parental education are represented by dummy variables.  
These variables take 1 if either of the parents has completed at least primary school, and 0 
otherwise.  Table 4 shows that children at higher levels of schooling are most likely to be from 
relatively rich households and to have better-educated parents. 
The fourth set of variables, associated with transitory income shocks, includes good or 
bad year dummy variables based on the household’s retrospective assessment of agricultural 
production, wage earnings, and livestock incomes.  The effects of health shocks are also 
controlled for by the dummy variables that take 1 if the head and/or his spouse are physically 
inactive and 0 otherwise.  Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) emphasize the importance of a distinction 
between the unanticipated and anticipated components of transitory income movements.  Health 
                                                                                                 
estimates are comparable. 
15 Although our theory requires the inclusion of asset accumulation as an independent variable, we utilize 
a total asset variable instead of its first difference.  This is simply because in rural Pakistan, the markets   22
shocks could be interpreted as unanticipated components because they are largely unexpected.  
Income movements, on the other hand, might include both anticipated and unanticipated 
components. 
The fifth block of control variables contains gender-specific school supply variables.  The 
first supply dummy takes 1 if a child is a boy and if there is a boys’ school in his village.  The 
second supply dummy variable takes 1 if the child is a girl and her village has a girls’ school.  At 
the primary school entry level, 34% of boys and only 19% of girls face no supply constraints for 
schooling (Table 4).
16 
The final block comprises a household’s social class or caste status.  Traditionally, caste 
status, called biraderi in Punjab and quam in the NWFP, has been defined based on occupational 
position (Eglar, 1960; Ahmad, 1977; Barth, 1981; Ahmed, 1980).  For example, landless 
agricultural laborers are strictly distinguished from landowners.  Nonagricultural laborers, such 
as casual laborers and artisans, are also differentiated from landowners.  This caste system has 
prevailed in the form of social norms, and members of each caste are expected to act according to 
their social and economic status.  The caste system indirectly constrains the educational 
opportunities of lower-caste children.  In order to capture these sociocultural effects, we include 
dummy variables for parents’ occupation—farmers with land, landless farmers or nonfarm casual 
laborers, and business and government officials.  The categories that are excluded are 
unemployed and/or those who stay home due to illness.  Table 4 shows that in the initial stage of 
schooling, about 44% of children hail from landless households.  At higher schooling stages, the 
percentage of children of landless farmers or casual laborers declines significantly.  
                                                                                                 
for land and agricultural machinery are few; therefore, we do not frequently observe change in assets. 
16 No village in our sample has upper-secondary and/or postsecondary education.  This implies that supply 
constraints such as the accessibility of schools are severe at higher levels of schooling.   23
Consequently, the share of the children of landowners increases after primary school graduation.  
These casual findings are consistent with the sociocultural background of Pakistani society. 
The average age of children in our sample was 20.5 years in 1998 (Table 4).  However, 
there is a large variation in age.  Some of those sampled are older than 50 years.  The age 
distribution indicates that there will be a potentially large cohort effect, which the empirical 
model needs to control for.  Hence, we include age cohort dummy variables. 
 
4.2.  Estimation Results of the Sequential Schooling Decision Model 
 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of the full sequential schooling decision 
model at each school level.  These results are derived from FIML estimations of conditional 
probabilities represented by equations (8) and (9).  Detailed descriptions and interpretations of 
our FIML estimation results are presented below. 
 
Gender Effects 
The coefficients on gender dummies indicate that girls have lower conditional schooling 
probabilities at the primary school entry and school completion levels than do boys (Table 5).  
This may reflect the different trends in returns to education by gender.  The absolute levels of 
coefficients on the dummies for females in the Punjab province are smaller than those in the 
NWFP at the level of primary school entry, indicating a smaller gender gap in education in 
Punjab.  These regional differences reflect the different degrees of sociocultural gender 
constraints in the two regions.  Yet, after secondary school entry, the coefficients on the female 
dummies are not statistically significant in either region.  The gender differences in education   24
appear to vanish among students studying at secondary and postsecondary levels in Punjab and 
the NWFP.  Therefore, school progression rates between male and female students become 
comparable at higher levels of schooling.  In fact, we found positive (although statistically 
insignificant) coefficients on female dummies at higher levels of schooling in Punjab. 
Table 6 summarizes the simulated marginal changes in schooling probabilities with 
respect to gender dummy variables, evaluated at the means of the dependent variables.
17  The 
marginal effects differ for girls and boys at the primary school entry level, and the difference 
disappears on completion of secondary school.  For example, other things equal, for girls, the 
probability of entering primary school is 37% lower than that for boys living in Punjab and 43% 
lower than that for boys living in the NWFP.  However, the probability of secondary school 
graduation is almost identical for boys and girls living in both provinces.  We also investigated 
the effects of the interaction terms between the gender and the household variables.  As Table 7 
shows, none of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that girl-child 
education friendliness is not necessarily captured by landownership or income shocks.  
Development researchers and practitioners have argued that in Pakistan, women are 
significantly less educated than men are (Khan, 1993; Shah, 1986; Chaudhary and Chaudhary, 
1989; Behrman and Schneider, 1993).  There are several possible explanations for the gender 
differences in education.  For example, the high opportunity costs of girls’ education in rural 
Pakistan may lead to intrahousehold discrimination against women in terms of education.  
                              
17 These marginal effects are based on the estimation results reported in Table 5.  To calculate the 
marginal effects in a given simulation, a certain value of the interest variable is assigned to all the 
households in the sample in a particular state.  The simulated probabilities are generated for each 
household by integrating the estimated distribution and averaging the probabilities across the sample.  
Next, the value of the interest variable is changed, and this changed value is assigned to the entire sample 
of households.  Then, a new set of simulated probabilities is generated.  The marginal effect, that is, the 
effect of the changes in the particular parameter on the probabilities of school participation, is calculated 
as the difference in these simulated probabilities.   25
Parents might have a negative perception toward girl-child education due to the custom of 
purdah. 
In summary, the results of our estimations indicate that gender differences in Pakistani 
education are schooling-stage-specific.  Although there are distinct gender differences in 
primary-level education, the gap is likely to disappear when children begin secondary-level 




According to the estimated coefficients on the sibling variables in Table 5, the number of 
older sisters appears to be positively associated with the higher probability of primary and 
secondary school entry for younger siblings.  Greenhalgh (1985) and Parish and Willis (1993) 
arrived at similar conclusions after analyzing the gender differences in education in Taiwan.  
Elder daughters may extend the household’s resource availability, either by marrying early or by 
serving as a source of domestic labor in the house.  In addition, since elder daughters naturally 
have fewer older sisters, the probability of elder daughters completing primary and secondary 
education is lower.  This suggests that households do not discriminate against all daughters; elder 
daughters might bear a large share of the burden under binding resource constraints (Strauss and 
Thomas, 1995). 
On the other hand, at the secondary school completion and postsecondary entry levels, 
having more elder brothers increases the schooling probability of a child.  This suggests that the 
education of the younger siblings at the secondary and postsecondary levels is supported partly 
by the contribution of elder brothers to household resources.  At these higher levels of schooling,   26
elder sons’ monetary contributions to household resources might be more important than elder 
daughters’ nonmarket domestic labor contribution. 
Existing empirical studies demonstrate mixed results for birth-order effects—that is, the 
effects of sibling resource competition over time.
18  There is no consensus in the literature on 
whether birth-order effects really exist, and if they do exist, on whether the effects are positive, 
negative, or nonlinear in form (Parish and Willis, 1993).  Our results suggest that, under credit 




Household Physical Assets 
At the decision point for primary school entry, the tractor ownership variable has a 
positive and significant coefficient (Table 5).  In impoverished Pakistani villages, tractor 
ownership is an obvious measure of a household’s wealth.  Hence, our results suggest that the 
probability of entering primary school is systematically higher for children hailing from wealthy 
households.  Moreover, it has been argued that technology and education complement each other 
                              
18 There are two possible outcomes (Behrman and Taubman, 1986).  The first possibility is a negative 
birth-order effect on education.  With the birth of more children, the household’s resource constraints 
become severe and fewer resources are available per child.  If this per child resource shrinkage effect is 
dominant, the younger (higher birth-order) siblings will receive lesser education than older siblings do.  
Alternatively, there can be a positive birth-order effect on education.  The effect of resource competition 
effects might decline over time since households can accumulate assets and increase income over time.  
Moreover, the older children may enter the labor market, contributing to household resources.  Therefore, 
younger (higher-order) siblings could spend more years at school.  Moreover, since siblings can share 
various educational inputs and materials, there might exist an economy of scale due to household-level 
public goods.  Positive knowledge externalities might be important as well since younger children can 
learn easily from the experience of their older siblings through homeschooling.  In summary, if resource 
extension effects, scale economies, and externalities are larger than competition effects, the presence of 
older siblings might promote rather than impede the education of a younger child. 
19 There has been progress in the literature on gender-specific birth-order effects.  For example, see 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) and Butcher and Case (1994).  Further, it is important to note that in the 
context of Pakistani villages, Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2003) found that Pakistani households operate 
as hierarchies with sexually segregated spheres of activities, which leads to gender-specific birth-order   27
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996).  It is likely that tractor 
operation requires at least a basic level of schooling.  At the postsecondary education entry level, 
the landownership variable has positive and statistically significant coefficients on conditional 
schooling probability.  At this level, household ownership of physical assets appears to play an 
important role in educational decision-making.
20  
 
Parental Human Assets 
In Table 5, variables reflecting parental education have consistently positive and 
significant coefficients at all primary and secondary levels of schooling.  These estimation results 
demonstrate important complementarities between parental education and investment in 
children’s schooling.  Most likely, these complementarities exist because better-educated parents 
have positive incentives for educating children, improved technical or allocative efficiency in 
agricultural production, and/or superior homeschooling environments (e.g., Schultz, 1964; 
Welch, 1970; Behrman et al., 2000).  Subjective factors associated with parental human assets 
might also be important.  As Table 8 shows, in 13.4% of the cases, households listed “achieved 
the desired level” as the primary reason for their children discontinuing school.  This is a purely 
subjective reason, implying that schooling choice may differ depending on ethnicity, network, 
and social status (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985).  Better-educated parents appear to be 
more capable of perceiving the benefit of education than uneducated parents since they can 
estimate the returns to education more precisely. 
These findings are consistent with the abovementioned EFH hypothesis and not with the 
                                                                                                 
effects. 
20 In general, households’ resource availability extends their self-insurance ability and thus encourages 
high-risk and high-return investment opportunities, such as higher education.  Risk-taking and   28
PTW hypothesis.  Educated parents value education in general and therefore try to invest more in 
all their children, regardless of gender, thus equalizing future incomes among children.  
Accordingly, the correlation between parental education and the child-level school progression 
rate becomes positive.  This finding is also consistent with a number of empirical studies 
reporting that parental education influences a child’s schooling, such as Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (2002), Black et al. (2003), Plug (2004), Sacerdote (2002), and Solon (1999).  Yet, 
unlike these studies, we found that parental contribution to a child’s schooling is education-stage-
specific and differs depending on the level of schooling: As can be seen from Tables 5 and 7, 
father’s education influences primary school entry, but school progression after primary school 
entry is more influenced by mother’s education. 
 
Household Shock Variables 
Households in rural Pakistan face considerable income instabilities.  As is evident from 
Table 5, negative income shocks discourage the continuation of schooling at the primary school 
completion and secondary school entry and completion levels.  Moreover, negative health shocks 
increase the rate of secondary school dropouts.  The risk of a large income shortfall, sickness, and 
the sudden death of an adult member is likely to impose serious constraints on a household’s 
resource allocation because the availability of formal and/or informal insurance and credit is 
severely limited in rural areas.  Therefore, exogenous negative shocks have non-negligible effects 
on a household’s educational investment decisions.  Pakistani households might be using child 
labor income as an insurance against parental income shocks, thereby sacrificing their children’s 
                                                                                                 
precautionary saving behaviors may be closely related to physical asset ownership (Morduch, 1990).   29
human capital accumulation.
21   
 
Other Control Variables 
Other factors, such as social status and supply of education, might also affect household 
schooling decisions.  Our results show that the school availability coefficients are positive and 
significant for girls’ schools but statistically insignificant for boys’ schools.  This suggests that 
the lack of primary and secondary schools in rural areas impedes the education of female 
students, while supply-side constraints do not affect the educational attainments of male students.  
The marginal effect of primary school availability in the village of residence is shown in Table 9.  
Access to a primary school in a village appears to contribute to an 18% increase in the 
probability of a girl entering primary school.  Moreover, the percentage of female primary school 
dropouts declines by 6%.  In fact, our qualitative survey data show that, in 40.3% of school 
termination decisions in the case of girls, households listed the supply-side constraints as the 
principal reason for their decision against further schooling (Table 8).  Hence, a significant 
proportion of the gender differences in Pakistani education may be explained by supply-side 
quantity and quality constraints (Alderman et al., 1995, 1996).  The lack of schools affects female 
education more seriously than it does male education because traditional Pakistani culture 
requires single-sex schools (Shah, 1986).  Parents are unwilling to send their daughters to school 
if there is no girls’ school nearby.  Since the risk of violating the purdah increases when girls 
cross a major road or a river on the way to school, parents refuse to send their daughters to 
schools located outside the village.  These sociocultural factors exacerbate the negative effects of 
constraints in school supply.  Moreover, sociocultural forces create the need for female teachers.  
                              
21 Sawada (1997) and Alderman and Gertler (1997) also found that shocks have an important impact on   30
It has been observed that irrespective of monetary or nonmonetary incentives, girls attend schools 
only if female teachers are present (Chaudhary and Chaudhary, 1989).
22  Even if there is a girls’ 
school in the village, the chronic shortage of female teachers imposes serious constraints on girls’ 
education.  Yet, we should also acknowledge the possibility that the availability of girls’ schools 
could be a reflection of demand factors. 
In the case of the final control variable—social class—the estimated coefficients indicate 
that at the primary and postsecondary entry levels, the children of business or government 
officials have the highest schooling probabilities.  The second finding is that at the primary 
school entry level, farmers who own land have higher levels of educational investments than 
landless farmers or casual laborers do.  These results suggest that occupation, which is 
traditionally a reflection of social status, affects educational investment decisions at the initial 
entry point and at higher levels of schooling. 
 
5.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we investigate the sequential educational investment process of Pakistani 
households by integrating field observations, economic theory, and econometric analysis.  We 
believe that this paper makes two contributions to the literature.  First, our analysis is based on 
                                                                                                 
school enrollment in rural Pakistan. 
22 Although the supply of teachers is partly constrained by the shortage of women candidates, the rural 
environment also prevents an increase in the number of female teachers in villages.  Attracting and 
retaining high-quality female teachers from outside the villages pose a different set of problems because 
these teachers must relocate, gain local acceptance, and overcome the obstacle of finding suitable 
accommodation.  There might be chronic absenteeism among locally recruited teachers as well due to 
domestic responsibilities (Khan, 1993).  Nevertheless, monetary compensation to attract women to the 
teaching profession remains inadequate.  Provincial governments, for instance, give teachers in villages 
lower house rent allowances than they do teachers in urban areas.  Moreover, there might be a quality 
problem with the schools, originating from teachers’ low educational levels (Warwick and Jatoi, 1994).   31
the unique data set on the entire retrospective history of child education and household 
background characteristics for villages in two regions of Pakistan.  The data for this study were 
collected exclusively through field surveys.  Second, we employed the FIML method to deal with 
the complicated estimation procedure of the multiple integration of conditional schooling 
probabilities.  This method, combined with the unique data set, enabled us to estimate the full 
sequential model of schooling decisions. 
One of the most striking aspects of rural Pakistani education revealed through the data 
collected is the high educational retention rate of girls.  Our analysis demonstrates the important 
dynamics of the gender difference in education and the significance of shock variables, wealth 
effects, and intrahousehold resource allocation for educational decision-making.  These findings 
are consistent with a household’s optimal educational investment under a binding credit 
constraint.  Hence, a possible policy recommendation is to relax the credit constraints that 
households face, perhaps through a scholarship program or interest-free student loans for female 
education.  For example, micro-finance programs might indirectly enhance educational 
investments.  Moreover, our results are in favor of the EFH hypothesis, and not the PTW 
hypothesis, at higher education levels. 
In general, however, it is difficult for the government to directly control the demand for 
education.  Hence, while it is possible that the lack of schools is demand-driven, supply-side 
interventions become critical.  The results of our estimations suggest that in addition to 
household demand considerations, increasing the supply of girls’ primary schools might have a 
substantial positive impact on educational achievements in Pakistan.  Indeed, the drive to 
improve access to schooling by increasing the supply of schools has dominated the education 
agenda in developing countries since the 1960s (Lockheed et al., 1991).  Yet, remote and   32
inappropriate locations for girls’ schools and the resultant high costs of schooling still constitute 
serious problems in rural Pakistan.  Therefore, the cost-effectiveness of providing primary 
education can be improved by directing the allocation of funds to recurring expenditures for the 
construction of girls’ schools and the employment of more female teachers.  These supply-side 
policy interventions have the potential to significantly reduce gender biases in human capital 
investment in Pakistan.    33
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Appendix A: A Summary of the Field Survey 
 
Field surveys were conducted on two occasions to gather information exclusively for this paper.  
In the first round of the survey from February to April 1997, the survey team conducted 
interviews in fourteen villages of the Faisalabad and Attock districts of the Punjab province.  Our 
selection of survey sites was predetermined, since we resurveyed the panel households that had 
previously been interviewed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) as part 
of the Food Security Management Project, based on a stratified random sampling scheme 
(Alderman and Garcia, 1993).  Faisalabad, the first district in our sample, is a well-developed, 
irrigated, wheat-producing and livestock-raising area.  Attock, the second district, is a rainfed, 
wheat-producing region near the industrial city of Taxila.  In this district, earnings from nonfarm 
activities constitute the major component of household income.  The second round surveys were 
conducted in eleven villages of the Dir district of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
from December 1997 to January 1998.  Dir, too, is a rainfed, wheat-producing area; it also 
engages in the production of some cash crops, such as citrus fruits.  There is a limited set of 
nonfarm income-earning opportunities within and around the district.  Temporary emigration to 
countries in the Persian Gulf is common in Dir.  The IFPRI data files reveal that as a result of 
this, nonfarm income and remittances account for more than 60% of the average household 
income.   
In our retrospective surveys, we used three different sets of questionnaires.  The first 
questionnaire comprises questions on basic child information and retrospective school 
progression.  The second questionnaire collects basic household background information, such as 
household size, permanent components of household resources, and temporal fluctuations in 
household assets and income.  Through the third questionnaire, we gathered village-level 
retrospective information by interviewing local government officials and/or educated village 
dwellers such as schoolteachers.  In particular, we collected information about the year when 
boys’ and girls’ primary schools were set up in the village. 
These questionnaires seemed to work effectively in the field.  Farmers recollected 
incidents related to child education and enjoyed talking about their children.  Each household 
interview lasted approximately one-and-a-half to two hours, largely depending on the number of 
children.  Our field surveys covered 203 households in Punjab and 164 households in the NWFP.  
Thus, 367 households were interviewed, and information on a total of 2,365 children was 
collected.  The combined data set presents a complete set of retrospective histories regarding 
children’s schooling behavior, along with household- and village-level information, which enable 
the estimation of a full sequential schooling decision model.  Moreover, the field survey data set 
is matched with the IFPRI data files.  Since our purpose is an estimation of the full sequential 
schooling decision model, we use a part of the IFPRI data files that contains long-term 
retrospective information on household and village characteristics.     40
Appendix B: An Analytical Solution of the Model 
 
We can derive an analytical solution of the model as presented in equations (1) and (2) if 
we specify the functional forms of the utility and human capital production functions.  For the 
utility function, we assume the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) specification. 
(A1)             ) exp(
1
) ( t t C C U α
α
α − − = . 
Note that α represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  For the human capital production 
function, we follow Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and select the exponential function: 
(A2)                  ( ) [ ] it it it it S q q S f − − = exp ) , ( 1 0 γ γ ,   
where γ0 > 0 and γ1 > 0 and it is easily verified that fS > 0 and fSS < 0. 
Given that parental human capital affects permanent income, let Yt
P(H
P)  and Yt
T represent 
the permanent and transitory components, respectively, of parents’ income, Yt(H
P).  Then, by 




T with Et(Yt) = Yt
P(H
P) and Et(Yt
T) = 0.  Our next 
assumption is represented by Yt ∼ N(Yt
P(H
P), σt
2)—that is, parental income follows an augmented 
i.i.d. normal stationary process.  Moreover, we select the following specification for the 
permanent income function: Yt
P(H
P) = θ H
Pt + h(H
P), where the first term in the right-hand side 
represents the human capital adjusted time trend of income with parameter θ.  The second term, 
h(•), is a general nonlinear function that defines the form of parents’ human-capital-specific 
wage profile.   
  There are two different solutions for this problem.  First, when a household can borrow and 
save money freely at an exogenously given interest rate, the credit constraint is not binding.  In 
this case, the household decides on the optimal schooling behavior so as to equalize the net 
marginal rate of the transformation of human capital production and the non-stochastic market 
interest rate.  Using the functional form of equation (A2), the optimal schooling decision rule 
then becomes approximately 
(A3)                    1 − + = it
N
it it S X S β , ∀ i, 
where Xβ
N is defined as  
(A4)            1 − − ≡ t it
N
it r g X β . 
Here, g represents the growth rate of q, which implicitly represents the returns to education, and 
X is a matrix of proxy variables for g and r.  Equation (A3) is a linear difference equation for the 
optimal schooling decision, S.  This equation indicates that the optimal level of schooling is a 
function of school availability and quality, gender-specific elements, and the market interest rate.   
  Alternatively, if the household is constrained from borrowing, the optimal condition 
becomes the equalization of the marginal rate of transformation to the marginal rate of 
substitution, as shown in equation (2).  Under the functional forms of equations (A1) and (A2), 
the reduced form schooling decision can be represented by the following linear difference 
equation:   
(A5)                                                it it
C
it it S X S ε β + + = −1 , ∀ i,  
where Xβ
C is defined as    41
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Note that εit indicates a mean zero expectation error of parental income Yt.  We allow the 
possibility of serial correlation for this expectation error.  There are four components of the 
matrix X.  First (I), X includes the trend in returns to education and household-specific subjective 
factors.  The second component (II) of X indicates educational resource competition among 
siblings.  For example, an increase in other children’s schooling time, ΔSjt, ∀ j ≠ i, or opportunity 
costs, wjΔSjt, decreases child i’s optimal level of schooling.  Alternatively, the wage earnings of 
older siblings will enhance the optimal time allocation to schooling by decreasing wjΔSjt.  The 
third term (III) is the ownership and accumulation of human and physical assets.  The fourth 
component (IV) shows that an ex post realization of the transitory income of parents, ΔYt
T, has a 
positive impact on a child’s schooling.  The final term (V) shows the negative effect of income 
instability.  This term essentially indicates that given a positive third derivative of the utility 
function, there is a motive for precautionary saving as ex ante optimal behavior against income 
instabilities.  The positive precautionary saving negatively affects child education since there is 
resource competition between asset accumulation and investment in education.   
An important testable hypothesis can be derived by comparing equation (A6) and 
equation (A4).  We can easily note that the four terms on the right-hand side of equation (A6)—
terms (II), (III), (IV), and (V)—should be 0 under perfect credit availability.  On the other hand, 
under the binding credit constraint, proxy variables for asset ownership and accumulation, 
transitory income, income stability, and sibling variables should affect a child’s schooling 
behavior.  Hence, our theoretical framework offers testable restrictions that characterize two 
different credit regimes. 
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Table 1 
Sample Probability of School Continuation 
 







 Male Female Male Female Male Female   Male Female
                     
Entered primary 
school  
h1/n1    0.59  0.22 0.59  0.33 0.62  0.32    0.58  0.15 
Primary school 
graduate 
h2/n2    0.78  0.67 0.67  0.72 0.82  0.67    0.81  0.63 
Entered secondary 
school  
h3/n3    0.91  0.48 0.96  0.33 0.85  0.54    0.92  0.56 
Secondary school 
graduate  





h5/n5    0.57  0.57 0.55  0.77 0.39  0.56    0.64  0.48 
Sample size  n1  853  857  199  184  181  172  473  501 
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Table 2 
Education-Friendliness Index (EFI): 
Percentage of Children at Each Education Level  
for Each Household 
(Average of the Relevant Sample) 
 
 
Education level (τ) 
Households that 
send at least one 




send no child to 
the τ+1 level 
Households that 
send at least one 
daughter to the τ+1 
level (percentage of 
daughters that 




send no daughter 
to the τ+1 level 
(percentage of 
daughters that do 
not progress to the 
τ+1 level)  
 
Primary school entry 
 













30.71% 18.75%  15.10%  5.83% 
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 Table  3   
Distribution of Age at School Entry 
 
Entire sample  Girls only 














      
Youngest 10% 
 
5 10  16 4 10  15 
25% 
 
6 11  16 6 11  16 
Median 
 
6 11  17 6 11  17 
75% 
 
7 12  18 7 12  18 
90% 
 
8 13  20 8 13  21 




















1,150  685 177 335 115  26 
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  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
Dependent variable           
Dummy variable = 1 if Sτ* = 1;  0 if Sτ* = 0, where τ = 1, 2, …,   0.41 0.75 0.81 0.82  0.57 
        
Gender and region variables        














































Sibling variables        




















Household’s physical and human assets        










Dummy variable = 1 if household owns tractor  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.06 
Dummy variable = 1 if the father has finished primary school  0.18  0.30  0.33  0.33  0.36 
Dummy variable = 1 if the mother has finished primary school  0.02  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08 
 
Household’s shock variables 
      
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a good year  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.12  0.06 
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a bad year  0.07  0.06  0.02  0.11  0.06 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head has a health problem  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.08  0.02 
Dummy variable = 1 if the wife of the household head has a health problem  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.09  0.04 
 
School supply variables 
      
Dummy variable = 1 if male and the village has a boys’ school  0.34  0.61  0.22     
Dummy variable = 1 if female and the village has a girls’ school  0.19  0.21  0.03     
 
Social class variables 
      
Retired, unemployed, or other (default category)  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.10 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head runs a business or is an officer  0.16  0.24  0.25  0.24  0.26 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a landowning farmer  0.30  0.37  0.36  0.39  0.37 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a landless farmer or casual laborer  0.44  0.33  0.31  0.28  0.27 
 
Cohort variables 
      
Dummy variable = 1 if above the age of 40  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10 
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 35 and 40  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.12 
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 30 and 35  0.12  0.15  0.16  0.17  0.16 
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 25 and 30  0.15  0.19  0.21  0.21  0.21 
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 20 and 25  0.17  0.24  0.25  0.25  0.26 













     
Number of observations  1710 693  518  417  340 
        
Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations.  Numbers in square brackets are the sample size of observations.   46
Table 5 
FIML Estimation Results of the Sequential Schooling Decision Model 










  S1   S2 S3 S4   S5
  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff. Std. error 
Gender and region variables             
Dummy variable = 1 child living in the NWFP  –0.036  (0.111)  0.390 (0.141)** 0.367 (0.212)**  0.630 (0.294)**  0.532 (0.238)* 
Dummy variable = 1 if female living in Punjab  –1.585 (0.358)*** -1.712 (0.594)***  –2.784 (0.501)***  0.605 (0.469)   0.286 (0.228)  
Dummy variable = 1 if female living in the NWFP  –1.927 (0.409)*** -1.629 (0.611)**  –1.926 (0.556)***  –0.428 (0.474)   -0.884 (0.616)  
               
Sibling variables             
Number of older brothers  2.351 (2.716)   2.744 (6.092)   6.820 (7.141)   16.300 (6.146)***   21.017 (8.613)** 
Number of older sisters  5.020 (3.041)*   -1.130 (6.670)   14.698 (8.123)*   2.178 (5.889)   3.410 (8.656)  
             
Household’s physical and human assets             
Amount of land owned  –2.270 (1.456)   -1.289 (2.220)   4.862 (4.397)   1.403 (2.617)   8.315 (4.501)*  
Dummy variable = 1 if household owns tractor  1.454 (0.568)***  -0.040 (0.560)   0.761 (0.611)     #  1.044 (0.588)*  
Dummy variable = 1 if the father has finished 
primary school 
1.001 (0.223)***  0.758 (0.301 )** 0.600 (0.313)*   0.103 (0.263)   0.220 (0.322)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the mother has finished 
primary school 
0.917 (0.390)**   1.253 (0.542)**  2.180 (0.722)***  0.451 (0.455)   0.733 (0.552)  
             
Household’s shock variables             
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a good year  –0.289 (0.340)   -0.540 (0.568)   –0.151 (0.772)   –0.147 (0.329)   0.072 (0.534)  
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a bad year  0.122 (0.355)   -1.462 (0.589)**  –1.675 (0.781)**   –0.633 (0.307)**   0.199 (0.509)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head has a 
health problem 
0.169 (0.384)   -0.551 (0.529)     #  –1.113 (0.377)***    # 
Dummy variable = 1 if the wife of the household 
head has a health problem 
0.097 (0.346)   -0.437 (0.603)     #  –0.503 (0.366)   -0.543 (0.581)  
             
School supply variables               
Dummy variable = 1 if male and the village has a 
boys’ school 
0.116 (0.161)  0.197 (0.459)   –0.301 (0.291)          
Dummy variable = 1 if female and the village has a 
girls’ school 
0.853  (0.222)*** 1.518  (0.429)***  1.356  (0.633)**          
             
Social class variables             
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head runs a 
business or is an officer 
0.753 (0.231)*** -0.319 (0.502)   –1.127 (0.621)*   0.346 (0.402)   1.627 (0.529)*** 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a 
landowning farmer 
0.441 (0.183)**  -0.504 (0.439)   –1.644 (0.663)**   –0.361 (0.373)   0.574 (0.465)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a 
landless farmer or casual laborer 
0.137 (0.146)   -0.761 (0.446)*   –1.363 (0.653)**   0.072 (0.390)   1.012 (0.542)** 
 
Cohort variables 
           
Dummy variable = 1 if above the age of 40  2.417 (0.510)***  1.901 (0.618)***  2.551 (0.744)***  0.484 (0.391)   1.179 (0.600)*  
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 35 and 40  2.802 (0.593)***  1.711 (0.525)***  2.560 (0.787)***  0.562 (0.372)   0.406 (0.538)  
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 30 and 35  2.667 (0.544)***  1.801 (0.450)***  2.346 (0.748)***  0.230 (0.314)   0.077 (0.492)  
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 25 and 30  2.741 (0.568)***  1.790 (0.468)***  2.652 (0.716)***  0.131 (0.293)   0.517 (0.469)  
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 20 and 25  2.874 (0.593)***  1.738 (0.433)***  2.121 (0.672)***  0.208 (0.290)   -0.194 (0.420)  
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 15 and 20  2.688 (0.562)***  1.228 (0.451)***  2.308 (0.661)***         
Dummy variable = 1 if aged between 10 and 15 
 
2.003  (0.517)***               
Constant  –2.699 (0.584)***  -0.053 (0.793)   0.143 (0.790)   0.822 (0.629)   -0.981 (0.655)  
              
Number of observations  1710    693   518    417    340   
Note: * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%.  # indicates that it is unfeasible to 
estimate coefficients due to colinearity and hence the variable has been excluded from the estimation.   47
 
Table 6 
Marginal Effects of Gender Dummy Variables from Table 5 
 
  S1  S2  S3  S4  S5 
  ∂P(δ1 = 1)/∂x
1  ∂P(δ2 = 1)/∂x
2 ∂P(δ3 = 1)/∂x
3 ∂P(δ4 = 1)/∂x
4  ∂P(δ5 = 1)/∂x
5
x
τ       
Female in Punjab 
 
–0.3690 –0.1188 –0.1150  0.0098  0.0081 
Female in the 
NWFP 
 
–0.4311 –0.1073 –0.1502  0.0080  –0.0104 
Note: The variable x
τ stands for the τ
th educational stage variable of our interest.    
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 Table  7 
FIML Estimation Results of the Sequential Schooling Decision Model: 
The Augmented Specification 










  S1   S2 S3 S4   S5
  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff. Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff. Std. error 
Gender and region variables             
Dummy variable = 1 child living in the NWFP  0.131 (0.096)  0.359 (0.197)*  0.317 (0.287)  0.766 (0.213)***  0.658 (0.328)* 
Dummy variable = 1 if female living in Punjab  –1.574 (0.333)***  -0.835 (0.512)** –2.891 (0.508)***  0.497 (0.488)   0.943 (0.907)  
Dummy variable = 1 if female living in the NWFP  –1.882 (0.350)*** -0.982 (0.603)   –1.946 (0.559)***  0.521 (0.526)   0.692 (0.815)  
               
Sibling variables             
Number of older brothers  2.288 (2.519)   2.351 (6.291)   6.649 (8.594)   15.857 (7.630)**   14.348 (11.642)  
Number of older sisters  5.127 (2.871)*   -3.291 (7.082)   16.211 (9.425)*   –2.002 (7.779)   1.136 (9.575)  
             
Household’s physical and human assets             
Amount of land owned  –1.163 (1.977)   -2.682 (2.219)   3.802 (6.570)   –0.514 (3.615)   4.836 (5.739)  
Dummy variable = 1 if household owns tractor  1.343 (0.614) **  0.007 (0.473)   0.731 (0.644)   #   1.154 (0.892)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the father has finished 
primary school 
1.021 (0.216)*** 0.856 (0.301)***  0.578 (0.353)   0.490 (0.288)*   0.722 (0.360)** 
Dummy variable = 1 if the mother has finished 
primary school 
0.853 (0.364)**  1.260 (0.617)**  2.122 (0.797)***  0.679 (0.538)   1.108 (0.649)  
             
Household’s shock variables             
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a good year  –0.022 (0.412)   -0.912 (0.677)   –0.281 (0.962)   –0.044 (0.450)   0.116 (0.652)  
Dummy variable = 1 if it is a bad year  0.255 (0.381)   -1.513 (0.671)**  –2.242 (1.083)**   –0.543 (0.476)   0.021 (0.634)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head has a 
health problem 
0.112 (0.398)   -0.670 (0.567)   #   –1.628 (0.520)***   –0.755 (0.721)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the wife of the household 
head has a health problem 
0.048 (0.340)   -0.204 (0.616)   #   –0.633 (0.461)   #  
             
School supply variables               
Dummy variable = 1 if male and the village has a 
boys’ school 
0.123 (0.166)   0.344 (0.508)   –0.564 (0.348)          
Dummy variable = 1 if female and the village has a 
girls’ school 
0.848  (0.215)*** 1.462  (0.458)***  1.466  (0.683)**         
             
Interaction  variables                   
Amount of land × Female  –0.528 (2.633)   1.456 (4.890)   –0.394 (9.872)   17.081 (11.917)   9.852 (16.736)  
Good year dummy × Female  –9.417 (8.721)   9.735 (18.495)   10.311 (61.477)   –8.451 (11.700)   -11.488 (17.103)  
Bad year dummy × Female  –2.377 (7.864)   -0.487 (20.684)   55.292 (90.434)   -11.109  (12.834)   12.953 (27.099)  
              
Social class variables             
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head runs a 
business or is an officer 
0.692 (0.223)*** -0.285 (0.524)   –1.260 (0.686)*   0.220 (0.471)   1.657 (0.804)*  
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a 
landowning farmer 
0.431 (0.168)**  -0.373 (0.512)   –1.741 (0.725)**   –0.351 (0.405)   0.942 (0.679)  
Dummy variable = 1 if the household head is a 
landless farmer or casual laborer 
0.129 (0.148)   -0.683 (0.426)   –1.439 (0.715)**   –0.179 (0.422)   0.887 (0.627)  
              
Constant  –2.591 (0.534)   -0.342 (0.872)   0.471 (0.875)   0.504 (0.620)   –2.133 (0.834)  
              
  1710   693   518    417   340   
              
Note: Results of cohort effects are not presented in this table.  * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = 
significant at 1%.  # indicates that it is unfeasible to estimate coefficients due to colinearity and hence the variable 
has been excluded from the estimation.   49
 
Table 8 
The Principal Reasons for Termination of Schooling 
 
  All children  Daughters only  Heads and/or spouses who 
have completed primary 
education 
Reasons given  Frequency  Percentage Frequency Percentage  Frequency  Percentage
Subjective reason        
        
Achieved the desired level  97  13.4%  16  8.6%  36  18.7% 
        
        
Economic reasons        
        
Education costs (tuition) too high  128  17.7%  18  9.7%  14  7.3% 
Needed on farm or at home  72  9.9%  21  11.3%  15  7.8% 
Got a job  55  7.6%  4  2.2%  12  6.2% 
        
        
Child-specific reasons        
        
Child is ill  23  3.2%  7  3.8%  7  3.6% 
Child  got  married  21 2.9% 17 9.1%  8  4.2% 
Child failed in an exam  55  7.6%  9  4.8%  20  10.4% 
        
Supply-side reasons 
 
      
Child does not want to go to 
school mainly because the school 
is too far and the teacher punishes 
children 
235  32.5% 75 40.3% 62 32.1% 
(Only “school is too far”)  (44)  (6.1%)  (35)  (18.8%)  (19)  (9.8%) 
        
Other  38 5.2% 19  10.2%  19 9.8% 
        
Total  724 100% 
 
186 100% 193 100% 
Source: Interviews conducted as part of our survey. 
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Table 9 
Marginal Effects of School Availability 
 
  S1  S2  S3 
  ∂P(δ1 = 1)/∂z
1 ∂P(δ2 = 1)/∂z
2 ∂P(δ3 = 1)/∂z
3 
z
τ     
Boys’ school available 
 
0.0301 0.0042  –0.0366 
Girls’ school available  0.1843 0.0591 0.0113 
     
Note: The variable z
τ stands for the τ
th educational stage variable of our interest.    
 
 